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INTRODUCTION

The black robe, pounding gavel, and austere judicial ceremonies all
combine to make the role of a judge one of the most revered and powerful
positions in our democratic society. Judges likely fulfill the highest form of
legal public service in the United States. Judges render decisions impacting
our family life, our professional careers, our finances, our criminal justice
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system, our overall system of governance, and numerous other important
aspects of daily life. Judges are expected to have a level of independence
and impartiality regarding the executive branch of government, the
legislative branch of government, and politics in general. In consideration of
the weighty role judges fulfill in our society, how should we select these
individuals who wield considerable control over society in general and our
lives in particular? Today, the process of judicial selection differs from state
to state, with common criticism for all methods of judicial selection. With
various options for judicial selection, questions and criticisms will always
remain as to what method renders the best outcome.
South Carolina's present judicial selection process is used by a minority
of states, with only Virginia employing a similar system.' South Carolina's
State Constitution stipulates that a specific segment of state judges are to be
selected by the South Carolina General Assembly with the assistance and
initial review by a Judicial Merit Selection Commission (JMSC). 2 The

JMSC, comprised of ten members, is empowered by state law to evaluate the
qualifications and fitness of individuals desiring appointment to various
judicial vacancies.3 The Commission consists of five members appointed by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three members appointed by
the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and two members
appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.4 South Carolina's
process has been criticized largely due to concerns regarding diversity
among the judiciary, lack of impartiality, separation of powers, and public
confidence in the system.'
This Note asserts that, in spite of common criticisms, South Carolina's
present system and process for judicial selection has improved since the
reforms of 1996 and is now structured to better serve the State's needs.
South Carolina's process for judicial selection, though not without flaws, has
produced a highly-qualified judiciary that is now more diverse and operates
effectively and independent of legislative control. Part II of this Note
provides a succinct background and history of judicial selection in South
Carolina and the events giving rise to the 1990s reforms to the state's
process of judicial selection. Part III of this Note briefly examines common

1.
Carl W. Tobias, Reconsidering Virginia JudicialSelection, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 37
(2008).
2.
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27.
3.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(A) (Supp. 2016).
4.
§ 2-19-10(B).
5.
Samantha R. Wilder, The Road Paved with Gravel: The Encroachment of South
Carolina's Judiciary Through Legislative Judicial Elections, 65 S.C. L. REV. 639, 652-60
(2014).
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forms of judicial selection methods throughout the United States, exploring
both their strengths and weaknesses. Part IV of this Note will discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of South Carolina's current system of judicial
selection. Part V of this Note will offer limited recommendations for
improvement to South Carolina's present system.
II.

BACKGROUND

The South Carolina State Constitution confers upon the South Carolina
General Assembly sole authority and responsibility to elect members of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, South
6
Carolina Circuit Court judges, and South Carolina Family Court judges.
Over the years, the process was viewed as inherently partisan, often resulting
in a significant number of judicial appointments filled by former members of
the General Assembly7 and those who were perceived to be part of the
"good-old-boy system." Many public, and arguably petty, battles were
fought over who would win the necessary votes to fill vacancies within the
judiciary. 9 After wide criticism concerning the lack of diversity,'o the
number of former legislators selected to fill judicial vacancies," and
perceptions of political influence and political corruption overriding
qualification and fitness to serve,' 2 South Carolina passed a state
constitutional amendment in 1996 establishing a Judicial Merit Selection
Commission (JMSC) to screen and exclusively nominate qualified
individuals from whom the General Assembly may fill judicial vacancies.1
These changes came on the heels of an especially bitter fight for a South
Carolina Supreme Court seat in 1996.14

6.
S.C. CONST. art. V., §§ 3, 78, 13 (Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts,
and "other courts"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80(A) (2005) (specifying family court).
7.

Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control of

JudicialMerit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1217, 1227 (1998).
8.
Kevin Eberle, Judicial Selection in South Carolina: nho Gets to Judge?, S.C.
LAW., May/June 2002, at 20, 22 (observing also that legislators who directly elect judges
"answer directly to the public").
9.
Driggers, supranote 7, at 1218.
10. See Wilder, supra note 5, at 652 (noting that lack of diversity was a major theme
underlying the 1996 reforms).
11. Driggers, supranote 7, at 1228.
12. Eberle, supra note 8, at 22.
13. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27. See also Driggers, supra note 7, at 1230 (discussing the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the JMSC).
14. See Driggers, supra note 7, at 1217-18 (referencing the contentious reelection of
Justice Jean Toal to the South Carolina Supreme Court by the South Carolina General

Assembly).
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Among the notable changes adopted in the 1990s, members of the
General Assembly were prohibited from being selected to serve in the
judiciary while serving in General Assembly and for one year after ceasing
to be a member of the General Assembly or failing to file for re-election.1
Principally, the most significant reform of 1996 came with the establishment
of the JMSC to assist the South Carolina General Assembly in selecting
judges.16 The JMSC is responsible for conducting preliminary screening for
South Carolina Supreme Court judges, South Carolina Court of Appeals
judges, Circuit Court judges, Family Court judges, and Administrative Law
Court judges.' 7 The South Carolina State Constitution stipulates that judges
elected by the General Assembly must be at least thirty-two years of age, be
licensed to practice law for at least eight years, and be a resident of South
Carolina for at least five years prior to consideration by the JMSC.' The
JMSC conducts a thorough review, both privately and publicly, of each
candidate, during which it evaluates candidates based on the following
criteria as mandated by state law: constitutional qualifications, ethical
fitness, professional and academic ability, character, reputation, physical
health, mental stability, experience, and judicial temperament.1 9 In addition
to these nine criteria, state law stipulates that the JMSC must consider race,
gender, national origin, and other demographic factors to ensure
nondiscrimination to the greatest extent possible as to all segments of South
Carolina's population.20 A committee of citizens, reflective of a broad range
of professional experience and racial backgrounds, also evaluates judicial
21
candidates as required by South Carolina law.
After the evaluation process is completed, the JMSC prepares a written
report to the General Assembly on each candidate as relates to the nine
22
criteria. From there, the JMSC submits to the General Assembly a list of
usually three candidates it finds qualified for judicial service.23 The General
Assembly may only elect judges from the individuals nominated as qualified
by the JMSC.24 State law was also modified to limit the ability of candidates

to seek support from sitting members of the South Carolina General
Assembly until formally nominated as a qualified judicial candidate by the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-70(A) (2005).
Driggers, supra note 7, at 1230 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80(B) (2005)).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80(A) (2005).
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 15.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-35(A) (2005).
§ 2-19-35(B).
§ 2-19-120(A).
§ 2-19-80(D).
§ 2-19-80(A).
§ 2-19-80(B).
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JMSC. 25 Judicial elections are held during the legislative session.26 In spite

of these changes and the establishment of the JMSC to perform official
vetting of judicial candidates, criticism still remains that South Carolina's
27
process needs reform.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Criteriafor Evaluation ofJudicial Candidates

Many evaluation factors can aid states in vetting qualified candidates for
judicial selection.28 Although these factors vary from state to state, there are
several common factors in judicial selection processes throughout the
29
country.
Some states set forth general qualifications within the state's
constitution or through enactment by state law, setting the minimum criteria
a candidate must possess for judicial appointment.30 These characteristics
may address a candidate's age, number of years as a licensed attorney,
residency requirements, and other requirements deemed appropriate for
judicial service. 3 ' In addition to these constitutional or statutory
requirements, judicial candidates are often subjected to an evaluation
process involving a comprehensive review of their ethical fitness,
professional and academic abilities, character, reputation, and other
32
factors.
Candidates for judicial appointment are commonly required to
provide details of their general work history, legal experience, memberships
in specific organizations or associations, and even their writings that may
have been published in journals, books, newspapers, or periodicals.33
Candidates for judicial appointment are also regularly subjected to
comprehensive scrutiny of their past actions and statements, both personally

25. § 2-19-70(C).
26. § 2-19-90.
27. See Driggers, supra note 7, at 1231 (noting that the remaining legislative control
over the JMSC creates the potential for abuse even within the current system).
28. See, for example, Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box
or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1197, 1225-26 (2000), for a discussion exploring
common criteria used in evaluating potential judges, including, but not limited to, minimum
education and experience, moral character, intelligence, impartiality, maturity, emotional
stability, courtesy, decisiveness, and administrative ability.
29. Id
30. Id at 1201.
31. Id at 1237.
32. Id
33. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions:
Independence, Accountability, andPublic Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 102-12 (2007)
(noting various methods for reviewing a judicial candidate's qualifications).
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and professionally, and are often required to provide references attesting to
the soundness of their character and reputation in the legal profession and in
34
their community at large. Such comprehensive reviews of one's past can
be both daunting and stressful, and may deter otherwise well qualified
35
candidates from seeking appointment to judgeships. Other soft factors may
also be used to evaluate judicial candidates, dependent upon the method of
selection. In states where there is direct election by the general public, a
candidate may be evaluated on the level of accountability he or she will
have, first to the law, and secondly to the community pertaining to judicial
36
decisions rendered. Accountability for decisions rendered is often an
important factor when reelecting existing judges.37 Separately, in recent
years, diversity in gender and ethnicity has more commonly become a factor
of evaluating judicial candidates. 38 A study published by the American Bar
Association noted that, "[m]ost Americans would agree that, racial and
gender diversity is an important quality for our nation's courts."39
Discussions about diversity and awareness of the need for diverse judicial
candidates who offer differing perspectives, backgrounds and experiences,
will likely continue to grow as the country's general population becomes
more diverse.
B.

Common Methods ofJudicialSelection

The specific process of judicial selection differs from state to state and
often varies based upon the type of judicial vacancy.40 The more common
forms of judicial selection include selection by direct election of state voters
through partisan or non-partisan elections, selection by direct election of the
state legislature, selection by gubernatorial appointment, and, in recent
years, hybrid forms of the aforementioned methods that involve the use of a

34. Maute, supra note 28, at 1225-26.
35. See, for example, Colquitt, supranote 33, at 102-20, for a discussion regarding the
comprehensive and far-reaching nature of evaluating judicial candidates.
36. Maute, supra note 28, at 1203-07.
37. See, for example, Colquitt, supra note 33, at 113-15, for a discussion of common
evaluation processes for the reappointment or reelection of sitting judges.
38. Malia Reddick, Michael Nelson, & Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial and Gender
Diversity on State Courts, 48 THE JUDGES' J. 3, 28 (2009).
39. Id
40. See, for example, Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT'L CTR FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfm?state=
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017), which highlights the various forms of judicial selection throughout
the United States.
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committee, commission, or board to vet judicial candidates. 4' Each method
of judicial selection has its praises and its criticisms. Generally, each state
must settle on the process that it deems will best serve its citizens.
1.

JudicialSelection by Executive Appointment

Today, several states select judges solely through executive appointment
42
by the governor. By some accounts, executive appointment is the quickest
and most efficient process for judicial selection. 43 Arguments in favor of this
system reason that the state's highest ranking executive, elected by the
citizens of the state, should have the power to appoint state judges.44 The
citizens, by power of their vote on a gubernatorial candidate, can effectuate
judicial accountability and changes in judicial philosophy by voting to
change the executive with judicial appointment power. This system of
judicial selection is commonly understood by citizens in states where it is
practiced because it mimics the system of judicial selection for many federal
judgeships appointed by the President of the United States. 45 Critics of
gubernatorial power to appoint judges often argue that the process is
politicized, much like the process of appointing federal judges, rather than
46
simply seeking the most qualified judges. Most governors align themselves
with a political party and have openly expressed political opinions on
47
judicial philosophy. These philosophies, which are quite often political, are
bound to guide the subjective criteria governors will use to select an
individual to fill a judicial vacancy. Flowing from that reasoning, critics
argue that judges may lack true judicial independence unless they are
appointed to lifetime judgeships, which is less common among the state
judiciary.48 Other criticisms of the gubernatorial appointment process lie in
the perception that gubernatorial appointments may lack diversity in gender
and ethnicity that would otherwise reflect the population of a state and

41. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection
Processin the UnitedStates, 75 MICH. B.J. 904 (1996).
42. Id
43. Colquitt, supra note 33, at 77.
44. Id at 79.
45. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For example, most Americans are familiar with
the constitutional authority granted to the President of the United States to appoint judges to
the United States Supreme Court with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.
46. Colquitt, supra note 33, at 77-79.
47. Id at 77-78.
48. See Wilder, supra note 5, at 647 (contrasting state systems for judicial selection
against the federal system of judicial selection, which provides for lifetime appointment of
some judges and a safeguard against salary reduction).
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perhaps the will of the voters. 49 This criticism is not singular to gubernatorial
50
appointment of judges and is leveled at many judicial selection processes.
2.

JudicialSelection by Popular Vote

A more widely utilized method of judicial selection is by direct vote of
the electorate through partisan and non-partisan elections.5 Some assert that
direct election allows the general population to have the greatest level of
52
influence in selecting state judges. Much like electing individuals to
political office, voters have the opportunity to consider a judicial candidate's
qualifications for a judgeship, professional history, personal history, political
affiliations, and judicial philosophy as stated directly by a candidate, thereby
allowing voters to make an informed decision on candidates the voter deems
best suited to be a judge. For judges running to be reelected to a specific
judicial post, voters can directly examine the record of decisions rendered by
a judge, a judge's personal life while occupying judicial office, a judge's
temperament, and other subjective factors a voter may deem important.
Though direct election may offer voters the greatest level of
participation in selecting state judges, this process is not without criticism.
Although several states have non-partisan judicial elections, some do have
partisan elections.53 Although enforcement and judicial interpretation of
laws should be blind to politics, partisan campaigns for judicial election can
serve to cast a negative light on a judicial candidate's ability to render
rulings without regard to political affiliation.54 Additionally, partisan
campaigns can become extremely expensive and can result in highlighting
party affiliation as a qualification that should supersede a candidate's legal
experience and ability to serve as a fair and impartial judge and interpreter of
55
the law. Perhaps most significant is the concern that direct election can

49. See, e.g., Reddick et al., supra note 38, at 30 (highlighting the influence of politics
in gubernatorial appointment of judges and observing that, "[n]ationwide, Democratic
governors appointed slightly higher percentages of minority (14.7%) and women (27.9%)
judges than did Republican governors (11.0% and 23.6%, respectively). The largest
discrepancies between Democratic and Republican governors are found for minorities on
courts of last resort (17.4% vs. 8.8%) and women on intermediate appellate courts (31.2% vs.
23.3%)").
50. See generally id. (highlighting concerns over diversity among all methods of
judicial selection).
51. Driggers, supra note 7, at 1223.
52. See id. (noting that direct election of judges "enshrines" the fundamental right of
citizens to vote).
53. Maute, supra note 28, at 1203.
54. Id. at 1204-05.
5 5. Id.
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have the perception of interference with judicial independence. Judges
subjected to reelection may fear that their decisions will be evaluated in the
court of public opinion and that their chances for reelection may be
determined by their political popularity rather than the merits and legal
57
grounds for decisions rendered. For these reasons, it is possible that many
well-qualified judicial candidates will not seek office in states that select
judges by popular election.
3.

JudicialSelection by LegislativeElection

Another much less commonly used method of judicial selection is
through election by a state's legislature.59 Only South Carolina and Virginia
use this method of judicial selection.6o Through this method of judicial
selection, legislators, as direct representatives of the citizens, indirectly
represent the interests of their constituency in selecting judges. 6' For many
years in South Carolina, legislative election of judicial candidates was done
with each legislator employing his or her own subjective criteria to evaluate
62
candidates vying for judicial appointment. In a 2015 legislative election for
judicial candidates in South Carolina, a member of the General Assembly
chided his fellow lawmakers that they should not elect judges based on the
mere qualification of, "I knew them in kindergarten, or something." 63
Judicial selection by legislative election is widely condemned based on a
combination of the criticisms hailed at the other more common forms of
64
judicial selection. Judicial selection by legislative election is deemed as
inherently political, perceived as lacking judicial independence, viewed as
valuing relationships over qualification for judicial service, and criticized as

56. Id. at 1204-07.
57. Wilder, supranote 5, at 644.
58. Maute, supranote 28, at 1205.
59. Driggers, supranote 7, at 1222.
60. Id.
61. See Eberle, supra note 8, at 22 (observing that legislators who directly elect judges
"answer directly to the public").
62. See Wilder, supra note 5, at 648-51 (noting that, prior to 1996, the process for
selection of state judges was much less formal, allowing members of the General Assembly to
select judges under their own subjective criteria).
63. Jamie Self, S.C. Lawmakers Hear Calls to Change the Way SC Elects Judges,
STATE: THE Buzz (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/politicscolumns-blogs/the-buzz/articlel3948829.html.
64. See Wilder, supranote 5, at 652-58 (highlighting concerns over judicial selection in
South Carolina even after the 1996 reforms).
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This process often is also

perceived as creating a disproportionate share of former legislators who,
through their well-established relationships with sitting members of the
66
legislature, are able to secure widely coveted judicial appointments.
Examples abound of bitterly fought battles by judicial candidates vying to
secure the backing of legislators, and the process is sometimes perceived as
67
corrupt. It is likely for these reasons that this method of judicial selection is
uncommon throughout the states.
4.

JudicialSelection through a Merit Commission

In the wake of criticisms of each of the aforementioned processes, many
states have established a hybrid form of judicial selection through which a
separate body of individuals is impaneled to evaluate candidates for judicial
appointment by the governor or for judicial election by a state legislature or
by voters.6 Though the process differs in each state, most merit selection
commissions are composed of attorneys and non-attorneys who evaluate
candidates and provide recommendations or nominations from a general
pool of candidates seeking judicial office.69 Merit selection commissions do
not have the final authority to select judges, but rather should exist to
provide a conceivably apolitical and thorough vetting process.70 Merit
selection commissions, when paired with selection by executive
appointment, public election, or legislative election, offer an effective
method to legitimize the judicial selection process by limiting political
interference and by creating a more objective process to evaluate judicial
candidates.7 Critics of merit selection commissions argue that these review
panels often exclusively consist of gubernatorial or legislative appointees
and are neither directly accountable to the public nor representative of the
72
public. Other critics argue that individuals appointed to merit selection

65. See id at 652-58 (highlighting concerns over judicial selection in South Carolina
even after the 1996 reforms).
66. Driggers, supra note 7, at 1227-28.
67. See id. at 1227-28 (highlighting perceived corruption associated with judicial
selection by legislative election).
68. Id. at 1224-25.
69. Id. at 1225.
70. See Deja, supranote 41, at 907 (discussing purpose of nominating commission).
71. See Colquitt, supra note 33, at 81 (noting the opinion that properly crafted merit
selection commissions enhance the judicial selection processes because they can be somewhat
independent of the political process and can adhere to democratic ideals).
72. See Driggers, supra note 7, at 1226 (discussing how committees are sometimes
controlled by elected officials appointed members).
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commissions often represent the "educational and occupational elite" of
society and do not adequately represent the public. 73 Conversely, it can be
argued that the capability to evaluate and recommend qualified candidates
for judicial selection requires a developed and experienced skill set that
inherently is not possessed by the general public.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT

OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION

SOUTH

CAROLINA'S

CURRENT

PROCESS

OF

Like many other states, South Carolina's process for judicial selection
can be described as a hybrid system even though it ultimately is driven by
legislative election.74 After nearly twenty years of operation, South
Carolina's JMSC provides a meaningful safeguard to constrain the General
Assembly to select only candidates who are actually fit and qualified to
serve in the state judiciary. Additionally, data shows that South Carolina has
made some progress in either maintaining or improving the racial and gender
diversity of the state. For example, in 2007, three of the nine members of
the South Carolina Court of Appeals were female and one was AfricanAmerican, which is identical to the racial and gender make-up of the court in
2017. 7 In 2007, of the forty-nine state circuit court judges, four were
African-American and seven were female.7 7 In 2017, of the forty-nine state
circuit court judges, six are African-American and eleven are female. In
2007, eight of the fifty-nine South Carolina Family Court judges were
African-American and nineteen were female.79 In 2017, nine of the fiftynine South Carolina Family Court judges are African-American and twentyfive are female.so In 2007, one of the six South Carolina Administrative Law
Court judges was African-American and two were female, which is also
identical to the racial and gender make-up of the court today.s
Most notably, in 2016, the General Assembly elected South Carolina
Supreme Court Associate Justice Donald Beatty to become the second
African-American since Reconstruction to serve as Chief Justice of the

73. Id
74. Wilder, supranote 5, at 648.
75. E-mail from Y. Elizabeth Wellman, Staff Attorney, S.C. Court Administration, to
author (Oct. 25, 2016, 11:27 AM) (on file with author).
76. Id
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id
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South Carolina Supreme Court.82 Arguably African-Americans and females,
in particular, may not have experienced the same level of representation
within the state judiciary without the process of judicial merit screening
prior to legislative elections. In spite of these positive strides, arguments
remain that the current process in South Carolina does not create enough
opportunities for expanded diversity in the judiciary.8 3 Critics assert that
changes to the current process are necessary to invite and encourage more
minority candidates to seek judicial office in South Carolina.84
Critics will contend that in spite of the JMSC's independent role in the
screening process, the South Carolina General Assembly maintains heavy
influence and control in the process because the JMSC is solely appointed
by the General Assembly. 5 For example, in Segars-Andrews v. Judicial
Merit Selection Commission, a South Carolina Family Court Judge
challenged the JMSC's decision not to nominate her for reelection by the
General Assembly. In its ruling to dismiss the judge's complaint against
the JMSC, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with an assertion by
the JMSC in its brief to the Court that "the Court is being asked to delve into
the subjective decision making process of the JMSC which is political in
,,87
nature.
In rendering the decision, the Supreme Court essentially
acknowledged the political nature of the JMSC.
Perceptions remain that former legislators and family members of sitting
legislators have an advantage over other candidates in the judicial selection
process.89 In 2015, many individuals, including the sitting governor, publicly
questioned the candidacy of Bill Funderburk for a seat on the State
Administrative Law Court because his wife was a sitting member of the
South Carolina General Assembly. 90 Although Mr. Funderburk's legal

82. John Monk, Beatty Wins S.C. Supreme Court Justice Post, STATE (Columbia, S.C.)
(May 25, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/article79793222.html.
83. Wilder, supra note 5, at 652.
84. See Kathryn M. Cook, Judicial Selection: Lack of Women in Judiciary is
Disturbing, HERALD-JOURNAL
(Aug.
29, 2004), http://www.groupstate.com/news/
20040829/judicial-selection-lack-of-women-in-judiciary-is-disturbing (observing that in spite
of reforms to the judicial selection process, more female and minority appointments are
needed).
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(A) (2005); see also Self, supra note 63 (noting concerns
over the South Carolina General Assembly's control over the nomination and election process
for state judges).
86. Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm'n, 387 S.C. 109, 115-16, 691
S.E.2d 453, 456-57 (S.C. 2010).
87. Id. at 459.
8 8. Id.
89. Self, supra note 63.
90. Id.
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credentials and experience arguably rendered him well-qualified and fit for
judicial office, his marriage to a sitting legislator cast a negative cloud upon
his candidacy and subsequent election. 91 Moreover, some reasoned that the
party affiliation and political positions taken by his wife would, on its own
merits, impact the success of his candidacy.92
More notably, arguments about legislative encroachment into judicial
authority surfaced during hearings in 2016 for a vacancy on the South
Carolina Supreme Court. 93 A decades old court battle between South
Carolina school districts and the State of South Carolina ended in a ruling by
the Supreme Court concluding that the State had not fulfilled its role of
providing a minimally adequate education for students in some rural and
poor areas of South Carolina.94 A split Supreme Court ordered the General
Assembly to take proactive measures by developing a plan of action to
improve public education in compliance with its ruling.95 In a rare act of
defiance, the South Carolina General Assembly flexed it muscles against the
96
timing requirements stipulated in the Supreme Court's ruling. In a public
show of the General Assembly's displeasure with the Supreme Court's
ruling, the issue became a key point of questioning regarding judicial
philosophy in the selection for a Supreme Court vacancy during hearings
conducted by the South Carolina General Assembly.97 Some contended that
the line of questioning for a judicial candidate posed by members of the
General Assembly reflected clear legislative control of the judicial selection
process and the potential for encroachment into the judicial decision making
process.

98

91. Id.
92. See id (noting concerns by a state representative that the political affiliation of Mr.
Funderburk's wife was the source of opposition against his candidacy).
93. See John Monk, SC Supreme Court Race: Lawmakers Fishingfor Anti-Abbeville
Sentiment, STATE (Columbia, S.C.) (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/
article57431843.html (observing that members of the General Assembly specifically
questioned justice candidates for the South Carolina Supreme Court about their opinion on the
recent Abbeville case ruling).
94. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 410 S.C. 619, 662, 767 S.E.2d 157, 180 (2014).
95. See Carolyn Click & Dawn Hinshaw, SC Supreme CourtFindsfor PoorDistricts in
20-Year-Old School Equity Suit, STATE (Columbia, S.C.)
(Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-govemment/articlel3911206.html
(discussing
the
historic nature of the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in the Abbeville case).
96. Id
97. See Monk, supra note 93 (noting how some members of the General Assembly
sought judicial candidates who would not have agreed with the South Carolina Supreme
Court's ruling in the Abbeville case).
98. Id
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On the other hand, there are clear examples of the independence of
South Carolina's judiciary even in the face of legislative control over the
judicial selection process. In 2014, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued
a ruling against the Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives
in an ongoing battle against the South Carolina Attorney General over an
investigation into alleged ethics violations by the Speaker.99 The Speaker has
authority to personally appoint half of the JMSC members and therefore has
considerable authority and influence in the judicial selection process,
including the selection of South Carolina Supreme Court Justices. 00 In spite
of the Speaker's considerable power to influence the nomination and
election process, the South Carolina Supreme Court demonstrated its
independence and a dedication to the rule of law when it ruled against the
Speaker and essentially allowed the ethics investigation to proceed.' 0' The
case represented a significant display of the judicial branch's authority and
independence from the legislative branch. Moreover, within the past year,
the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a sharp rebuke in its ruling against
the sitting South Carolina Attorney General in a case involving the authority
of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations of ethics violations and
misconduct among members of the South Carolina General Assembly.102
When the Attorney General attempted to intervene in the investigation and
remove the special prosecutor, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
the Attorney General could not interfere with the ongoing investigation and
allowed the investigation or certain members of the General Assembly to
proceed.1 03 After the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling, the ethics
investigation continued and has resulted in criminal charges brought against
a powerful member of the General Assembly.104 The aforementioned two

99. See generally Harrell v. Attorney Gen. of State, 409 S.C. 60, 70, 760 S.E.2d 808,
813 (2014) (opining that the South Carolina Attorney General's Office did not have authority
to proceed with an investigation of the Speaker of the South Carolina House of
Representative).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10(B)(1) (2005).
101. See generally Harrell, 409 S.C. at 71, 760 S.E.2d at 814 (reversing a lower court's
ruling to end an ethics investigation into actions by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives by the South Carolina Attorney General, the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision ultimately allowed the case to be remanded to the lower court and the investigation
continued, resulting in criminal charges and the subsequent resignation of the Speaker).
102. See Pascoe v. Wilson, 416 S.C. 628, 647, 788 S.E.2d 686, 696 (2016) ("[T]he
Attorney General's purported termination of Pascoe after the initiation of the state grand jury
was ineffective.").
103. Id.
104. See Clif LeBlanc, Cassie Cope & Avery G. Wilks, Lowcountry LegislatorAccused
of Misconduct in Office Violating Ethics Law, STATE (Columbia, S.C.) (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-govemment/articlel20875808.html
(providing
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cases represent a strong argument for effective judicial independence under
the current method of judicial selection in spite of the role that the South
Carolina General Assembly plays in electing many state judges.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Increase the Number of Nominees the JMSC May Submit to the
South CarolinaGeneralAssembly for Election

One area that offers potential for improvement is increasing the number
of nominations allowed after screening by the JMSC. Although state law
limits the JMSC to three nominations for a judicial vacancy, the process
05
through which the JMSC arrives at its three nominees remains subjective.
Several candidates may be found "qualified" and "fit" to serve, yet the
JMSC can exercise its authority to choose which of those qualified and fit
candidates are nominated. o0 This process leaves open the possibility for
criticism that outside influence, including undue legislative influence, may
be brought to bear in determining which candidates are nominated. The
process also leaves many unanswered questions about why certain judicial
candidates who are deemed qualified and fit are not nominated. Arguably, an
unlimited number of judicial nominees would present an unmanageable
challenge for the General Assembly to consider. However, a modest increase
to allow up to five nominees could create greater opportunities for diversity
among the state's judiciary and may give rise to a more thorough review and
deliberate consideration of a larger group of candidates by members of the
General Assembly.
B.

Establish Statutory Authority for the Governor to Have Formal
Participationin the JudicialSelection Process

One glaring absence from South Carolina's process is the participation
of the state's chief elected officer, the governor. South Carolina's governor
is elected by the majority of voters in the state and arguably represents the
political and philosophical beliefs of the majority of the state's voters. Yet,
the governor currently has no constitutional or statutory authority to appoint

overview of the ongoing investigation of a state special prosecutor and criminal charges
brought against South Carolina State Representative Jim Merrill for various violations of state
laws).
105. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80(A) (2005).
106. Id.
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"

judges, fill judicial vacancies, or appoint members of the JMSC. 0 7 In South
Carolina, the absence of gubernatorial participation in the judicial selection
process is by design and not by mistake. 08 South Carolina has a long history
of power struggles between the executive and legislative branches of
government.1 09 Consequently, the South Carolina General Assembly likely
has little appetite for expanding gubernatorial power. South Carolina's
executive and legislative branches would be well served to consider
amending the current judicial selection process to, at a minimum, provide
the governor with authority to appoint some members of the JMSC. Similar
proposals by members of the General Assembly have gone unheeded.110
Such an amendment to the current process would allow the state's chief
elected officer to ensure that the philosophical qualifications expressed by a
majority of the state's voters are represented when evaluating judicial
candidates. Additionally, in realization that the General Assembly would
likely be unwilling to completely transfer its power to elect judges,
consideration should be given to empowering the governor with authority to
fill any mid-term judicial vacancies rather than requiring a new election by
the General Assembly. Allowing the governor to fill interim judicial
vacancies, as is the process in some other states, provides a balanced
approach to power sharing between the executive and legislative branches of
state government.
C. Establish a Statutory or Regulatory Requirementfor a Creationof a
HistoricalDemographic Data Collection System on All Candidates
Seeking Judicial Office in South Carolina
Increasing diversity in the state judiciary, particularly among women
and minorities, was impliedly a goal of the 1996 reforms to judicial selection

107. See Self, supra note 63 (discussing legislative control over the judicial selection
process in South Carolina and the absence of gubernatorial involvement in the process).
108. See id. (highlighting numerous failed legislative proposals seeking to formally
include the governor in South Carolina's judicial selection process).
109. See, for example, Gina Smith, High Court Rules Against Haley, STATE (Columbia,
S.C.) (June 6, 2011), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/articlel4393663.html, which notes
the history of public court battles and power struggles between the South Carolina Governor
and the South Carolina General Assembly.
110. See Self, supra note 63 (discussing proposals by various members of the General
Assembly to consider changes to the judicial selection process).
111. Maute, supra note 28, at 1203.
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in South Carolina.112 Arguably, there is no single effective method to assure
improved diversity among a state's judiciary. For example, the American
Bar Association released a study on diversity among state courts throughout
the nation and found that, "on intermediate appellate courts, more minority
judges attained their seats through merit selection, but partisan elections
placed slightly more women on these courts." 3 Without clear reasoning,
different selection methods can produce different outcomes. However, each
method of judicial selection brings its strengths and weaknesses in relation
to improving judicial diversity. In general, the study released by the
American Bar Association noted that "several studies have found no link
whatsoever between selection systems and diversity on the bench.""14
Although South Carolina's current process for judicial selection requires
the consideration of factors relating to diversity, state officials do not
maintain a formal database containing diversity statistics on unsuccessful
candidates for judicial office. In researching data for this Note, there was an
obvious void in the availability of prepared historical data on unsuccessful
candidates for judicial office in South Carolina. The absence of this type of
historical demographic data likely impedes the ability of the South Carolina
General Assembly and citizens to fully assess the state's progress in
diversifying the state judiciary since the 1996 reforms. At a minimum, the
South Carolina Court Administration, functioning under the auspices of the
Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, should be tasked with
developing and maintaining a formal historical demographic database that is
regularly updated and made available to the public. Historical demographic
data, especially pertaining to unsuccessful judicial candidates, is particularly
helpful in identifying patterns of failure to obtain nomination and subsequent
election within a particular demographic group.!
VI. CONCLUSION

Today, little publicity surrounds the process for judicial selection in
South Carolina. By contrast to the period of contentious judicial elections

112. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-35(B) (2005) (although not a requirement or quota for
judicial selection, the 1996 reforms established specific evaluation criteria relating to race,
gender, national origin, and other demographic factors).
113. Reddick et al., supra note 38, at 29.
114. Id. at 28.
115. See, for example, § 2-19-35(B) on the diversity criteria to be reviewed by the
JMSC. Maintaining a formal system of historical data, particularly for unsuccessful candidates,
should be established in South Carolina based on the metrics of evaluation used by the JMSC
under the current state law.
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preceding the reforms of 1996, today's judicial elections are much less
contentious and rarely garner significant public attention. With exception to
the infrequent elections to fill seats on the South Carolina Supreme Court,
the media even gives limited coverage to judicial elections. With the recent
election and swearing in of the second African-American Chief Justice of
the South Carolina Supreme Court since reconstruction, even arguments that
minorities are underrepresented are less persuasive.
In the absence of a
public outcry over the present judicial selection process, it is unlikely that
the recommendations contained in this Note would receive immediate and
formal consideration by the State of South Carolina. Nevertheless, as South
Carolina's process remains uncommon and regularly criticized in
comparison to states across the nation, the time will hopefully come for
additional process reforms that will allow South Carolina's process of
judicial selection to continue improvement and further build upon the 1996
reforms.

116. See Monk, supranote 82 (noting the election of Justice Donald Betty as the second
African-American Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court since Reconstruction).
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